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11 Introduction
When output is high, U.S. rms as a whole issue more debt, invest more, and pay more to sharehold-
ers. Debt issued and equity payouts are both positively correlated with investment and positively
correlated with each other. These ndings suggest that rms use debt nancing both to invest in
their operations and to increase payments to shareholders. While borrowing to nance investment
is well understood, borrowing to pay shareholders is more puzzling. Why would rms systematically
transfer resources from bondholders to shareholders over the business cycle?
The workhorse model for analyzing business cycle correlations among macroeconomic variables
is the real business cycle (RBC) model. However, traditional RBC models abstract from rm nanc-
ing decisions. In the standard setup, a representative consumer-rm has access to a neoclassical
production function and makes optimal consumption-investment decisions given a known stochastic
process for productivity.1 An implicit assumption is that rms can costlessly reallocate resources
in order to maximize the consumer's lifetime expected utility. A consequence of this approach is
that conventional RBC models have little to say about nancial behavior over the business cycle.
In reality, of course, rms have an array of options for nancing their activities. In particular,
rms can raise capital by borrowing at a xed interest rate, by issuing equities, or by using internal
funds. The classic paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that if capital markets are
frictionless, rms should be indierent regarding their capital structure. However, a common view
in the corporate nance literature is that rms pursue a nancial mix that balances the costs
and benets of dierent forms of nance (Leary and Roberts (2005)). According to this \tradeo
theory" of capital structure, nancial frictions such as interest tax deductions and bankruptcy costs
pin down a rm's optimal debt-equity ratio (see, for example, Scott (1976) and Miller (1977)). In a
wide-ranging survey of CFOs conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001), most respondents reported
that they have at least a loose target for their rms' debt-equity ratio. Many of the participants
stated that interest tax deductions and credit ratings inuence decisions about how much debt to
issue.
In this paper I add a corporate nance decision to a standard RBC model. Firms decide how
much debt to issue and how much to pay shareholders by weighing the costs and benets of debt
and equity nancing. My goal is to explain some stylized facts about aggregate debt and equity
ows in U.S. data. First, aggregate corporate borrowing and payouts to shareholders are almost
always positive throughout the postwar period (1952 { 2007). Second, debt issuance and net equity
payouts are (i) positively correlated with output, (ii) positively correlated with investment, and
(iii) positively correlated with each other. Third, real variables have become less volatile in recent
years, while nancial variables have become more volatile.
The key feature of the model is a set of parameterized nancial frictions. On the debt side,
interest payments are tax deductible. This makes debt nancing preferred to equity nancing for
1For an example of a \standard" RBC model, see Hansen (1997).
2low levels of debt. However, I also require bondholders to pay a monitoring cost that is increasing in
the rm's debt-to-capital ratio. The tradeo between the debt tax shield and the monitoring costs
determines the rm's optimal level of debt. On the equity side, I assume that it is costly for rms
to adjust their payouts to shareholders. This assumption is consistent with evidence that rms
tend to smooth dividends over time. It also captures, in a stylized way, the legal and accounting
costs associated with issuing and repurchasing equity shares.
I calibrate the model to U.S. data for the postwar period 1952 { 2007. In contrast with a
standard RBC model, my model predicts positive borrowing at all points in the business cycle. The
model correctly implies that debt issuance and equity payouts are procyclical, positively correlated
with investment, and positively correlated with each other. Finally, I calibrate the model to two
separate time periods, 1952 { 1983 and 1984 { 2007, in order to explain the stylized facts described
by Jermann and Quadrini (2007): namely, that real variables have become less volatile in the second
subperiod, while nancial variables have become more volatile. By varying both the scale of the
technology shocks and the degree of nancial frictions, the model can match both facts.
I interpret these results as evidence that the types of frictions modeled { tax incentives, debt
monitoring costs, and equity adjustment costs { can help explain the degree to which rms use debt
nancing to increase payments to shareholders. The results also provide support for a \dynamic
tradeo theory" of capital structure: rms target an optimal debt-equity ratio, but the target
evolves over time as economic conditions change.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on capital structure over the business cycle. The
debt friction can be viewed as a reduced form of the debt enforcement problem in Bernanke et al.
(1999). Relative to their model, my model allows for equity issuance. Covas and den Haan (2006),
Levy and Hennessy (2007) and Jermann and Quadrini (2007) all present models of debt and equity
nancing over the business cycle. Covas and den Haan have a partial equilibrium model of debt
and equity nance where the interest rate process is exogenous. In contrast, the risk-free rate in
my model is determined endogenously in general equilibrium. Levy and Hennessy (2007) consider
a general equilibrium problem where managers can nance investment with debt or equity but are
allowed to divert resources from both bondholders and shareholders. I dier by assuming that
the rm's objective is aligned with that of shareholders. In my model, the equity friction reects
adjustment costs rather than an explicit agency problem.
My model is most closely related to Jermann and Quadrini (2007). They present a model of
debt and equity nance and use it to explain the reduced volatility of macroeconomic variables
and increased volatility of nancial variables over the past two decades. My paper diers in three
main ways. First, the key shock in Jermann and Quadrini's main analysis is an asset price shock,
whereas I consider a standard technology shock. Second, Jermann and Quadrini's debt friction
takes the form of an endogenous \debt ceiling", above which rms cannot borrow at any price. In
practice, however, rms do not face a strict ceiling on debt; rather, the cost of debt may increase if
rms borrow excessively. I attempt to capture this phenomenon through monitoring costs. Third,
3while Jermann and Quadrini also consider a convex cost for equity payouts, their cost function
is increasing in the deviation of today's equity payout from its long-term target. In contrast, my
cost function is an adjustment cost: it is increasing in the deviation of today's equity payout from
yesterday's payout. I argue that this more naturally captures the legal and nancial costs that I
am trying to model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 documents some stylized facts about
debt and equity ows. Section 3 explains the nancial frictions that I attempt to model. Section 4
presents the model. Section 5 discusses calibration and presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Debt and Equity Flows in the U.S.
In this section I discuss the empirical features of debt and equity ows that I would like my model
to capture. Figure 1 plots aggregate debt issued, equity payouts, and real xed investment in the
U.S. nonfarm sector, measured in billions of 2000 dollars. Data are quarterly ows from the Federal
Reserve's Flow of Funds and the BEA's NIPA accounts (for xed investment) for the period 1952:1
{ 2007:4. I convert nominal ows to real ows using the BEA price index for value-added in the
nonfarm sector. \Debt Issued" is the net increase in credit market liabilities over the quarter. A
negative number reects a net repayment of debt by businesses. \Equity Payout" equals dividends
plus net repurchases of equity shares in the corporate sector, less proprietors' net investment in
the noncorporate sector. The idea is to capture net ows to shareholders as a group, including
small business owners. I view dividends and equity issues as two sides of the same coin: a rm
that wishes to \raise capital" through equity may do so by lowering its dividend, by oering new
shares, or both. Equivalently, a rm that wishes to \reward shareholders" may do so by increasing
its dividend, by repurchasing shares, or both. The analysis reect this presumed equivalence of
dividends and share repurchases.2
A number of facts emerge from Figure 1. First, debt issued and net equity payouts are almost
always positive over the postwar period. In aggregate, the U.S. business sector rarely issues equity or
repurchases debt. Positive borrowing, in particular, suggests that some degree of leverage is optimal
for rms. A second regularity is that debt issued and equity payouts are positively correlated. This
close co-movement is especially striking beginning in the late 1980s. This suggests that net debt
issuance and equity issuance are substitutes for rms.3 Third, both debt issued and equity payouts
are positively correlated with investment. Finally, debt issued and equity payouts are considerably
more volatile in the second half of the period.
Table 1 computes business cycle correlations for equity payouts, debt issued, real GDP and
real xed investment. I have detrended all variables with a Hodrick-Prescott lter. Debt issued
and equity paid are both positively correlated with GDP (\procyclical"), positively correlated with
2Jermann and Quadrini (2007) also consider net equity payouts, measured in a similar way.
3Contrast this with Covas and den Haan (2006), who nd that debt and gross equity issuance are complements.
Covas and den Haan do not subtract share repurchases from equity issuance.
4investment, and positively correlated with each other. These ndings suggest that rms borrow
more heavily during booms. Firms apparently use the proceeds from borrowing both to invest and
to nance higher payments to shareholders.
Table 2 presents business cycle volatilities for the two subperiods 1952 { 1983 and 1984 { 2007.
Debt issued and equity payouts (as shares of GDP) have become more volatile.4 In contrast, real
GDP and real investment have become less volatile, a well-documented phenomenon known as
business cycle moderation.
I summarize the stylized facts from this section as follows. First, aggregate debt issued and
equity payments to shareholders are almost always positive over the business cycle. Second, debt
issued and equity payouts are (i) positively correlated with output, (ii) positively correlated with
investment, and (iii) positively correlated with each other. Third, debt issued and equity payouts
have become more volatile starting in 1984, while real variables have become less volatile.
The next section describes and motivates the nancial frictions that I model. Section 4 presents
the full model.
3 Financial Frictions
Conceptually, rms can nance their activities with debt, equity, or internal funds. In the model,
debt nancing takes place through one-period corporate bonds. Corporate bonds are issued by
rms and pay a \quoted" interest rate rt, but they require costly monitoring to ensure repayment.
Consumers are the investors are in this model, so they pay the monitoring costs. Monitoring costs
for a rm's debt are assumed to be a linear function of the rm's debt-to-capital ratio Lt, which







 is an exogenous parameter that controls the scale of the debt friction. Monitoring costs can
be motivated as follows. Each period a rm could, in principle, default on its debt and enter a state
of bankruptcy. Default is more likely the larger the amount borrowed relative to the rm's capital
stock, which serves as collateral. Assume that bankruptcy is a distress state with unavoidable
deadweight losses. In this setting, monitoring costs can be interpreted as a safety buer against
potential bankruptcy costs. Despite this motivation, I do not explicitly model bankruptcy. In
particular, there is no default in equilibrium: investors always pay the monitoring costs, and the
rm always repays its debt.5
4I scale equity payouts and debt issued by nominal GDP (value-added in the nonfarm sector) when computing
volatilities. The increase in volatility is even more dramatic when these variables are not scaled by GDP. Measured
in billions of chained 2000 dollars, the volatility of equity payouts increased by a factor of 3:78 and the volatility of
debt issued increased by a factor of 2:48.
5A deeper foundation for monitoring costs would require explicitly modeling the bankruptcy-inducing event. A
5An alternative interpretation of the debt friction is that it reects a rating eect. There is
ample evidence that rms are concerned about credit ratings when deciding how much debt to
issue; see Graham and Harvey (2001) and Kisgen (2006). One of the metrics that rating agencies
use to evaluate creditworthiness is a rm's debt-to-capital ratio. Figure 2 shows the median debt-
to-capital ratio for rms with dierent credit ratings. Firms with higher debt-to-capital ratios tend
to have lower ratings.6 It is also well known that lower-rated corporate bonds have greater yields
than higher-rated bonds. Therefore, it is more costly for rms with low credit ratings to issue
corporate debt. The monitoring cost in (1) can thus be interpreted as reecting the eect of higher
debt levels on the cost of debt via a lower credit rating.
Interest paid on corporate debt in the U.S. is tax-deductible to the rm, a concept known as






1 + (1   )rt
(2)
 is the marginal corporate tax rate. Note that the eective cost of debt to the rm is (1 )rt.
Note that in general, P
B;C
t need not equal P
B;F
t . For example, in the model, the tax deduction
enjoyed by rms is paid for by a lump-sum tax on consumers. This creates a wedge between the
proceeds a rm receives from issuing a bond and the price that consumers pay for a bond. Since the
rm perceives that it can issue bonds at a favorable price, it will want to issue a positive amount
of debt. However, the price of corporate debt to consumers rises with the amount issued because
of the monitoring costs described above. As the price of debt increases, consumer demand for
corporate bonds declines. The tradeo between the tax advantage and monitoring costs will pin
down the equilibrium level of debt and the \quoted" rate rt in equilibrium.
On the equity side, I assume that it is costly for rms to adjust their payouts to shareholders.
Conceptually, the equity payout in the model reects net ows to shareholders: dividends plus
repurchases of shares, net of new issues. I impose the following quadratic cost function for a rm
that wishes to pay Dt at time t, given last period's payout, Dt 1, and the capital stock carried over
from last period, Kt 1:
standard approach uses an idiosyncratic shock and a debt contract. The debt contract species an interest rate and
a cuto value for the shock above which the rm always repays. Examples include Bernanke et al. (1999) and Covas
and den Haan (2006). I take a simplied approach to the debt friction in order to avoid the heterogeneity arising from
idiosyncratic shocks. Since my focus is on aggregate uctuations over the business cycle, little explanatory power is
lost by making this simplication.
6Here, \capital" refers to a rm's outstanding debt plus its outstanding equity, which together equal the rm's
assets. In the model, a rm's only asset is its capital stock. Therefore, I treat the \debt-to-capital ratio" in the model
as the ratio of a rm's outstanding debt to its capital stock.






,  > 0 (3)
Note that the adjustment cost is increasing in the percentage change of today's payout from
yesterday's payout. The parameter  controls the scale of the adjustment cost. The convex func-
tional form given here is consistent with evidence that rms tend to smooth dividends over time, an
observation rst made by Lintner (1956). It also consistent with evidence regarding the legal and
accounting costs associated with issuing and repurchasing equity shares. For example, Hansen and
Torregrosa (1992) and Atlinkilic and Hansen (2000) show that underwriting fees exhibit increasing
marginal cost in the size of the equity oering. I note that the adjustment cost here diers from
Jermann and Quadrini (2007) in an important way. My cost function is the deviation of today's
equity payout from yesterday's payout, rather than the deviation of today's equity payout from its
long-term target. In a model with persistent productivity shocks, the rm's optimal long-term
target may be very dierent from its optimal short-term payout. For example, in a model that
uctuates around a steady-state, the optimal current payout to shareholders is typically larger than
the steady-state payout whenever productivity is above its steady-state level. It is not clear why
it should be expensive to be away from the long-term target if the current payout is optimal for
shareholders. The cost function in (3) is a true adjustment cost: it is increasing in the percentage
deviation of today's payout from yesterday's payout. Arguably, this specication more naturally
describes the legal and accounting costs that I am trying to model.
Finally, a rm can of course nance its investment through the use of internal funds. In the
model, \internal funds" consist of a rm's current output plus its undepreciated capital stock. I do
not model capital adjustment costs, so it is costless for a rm to use its internal funds to increase
or decrease its capital stock.
The nancial frictions serve two roles in the model. First, they determine the rm's optimal
(positive) level of debt even in the absence of stochastic shocks. Second, they aect the way in
which the rm reacts to shocks. In response to a positive, persistent productivity shock, the rm
would like to both increase investment (to take advantage of higher expected productivity) and
pay more to shareholders (to pass on the unexpected increase in lifetime protability). If debt is
available and the cost of changing the equity payout is low, the rm accomplishes this by borrowing
heavily to boost its capital stock and increase payments to shareholders. On the other hand, if the
cost of adjusting equity is high, the rm seeks to avoid large swings in its payout. As a result, the
rm increases payouts only gradually, and its borrowing is both lower in magnitude and delayed in
time.
74 The Model
The model economy consists of a continuum of identical consumers and a continuum of identical,
perfectly competitive rms. First I specify the consumer's problem and the rm's problem. I then
dene an equilibrium and briey discuss the solution procedure.
4.1 Consumer's problem
A representative consumer can hold one-period risk-free bonds, ~ Bt, one-period corporate bonds,
Bt, and shares of rms, St. Risk-free bonds pay the net interest rate ~ rt with certainty. Corporate
bonds are issued by rms and pay the \quoted" interest rate rt, but they require costly monitoring
in order to ensure repayment. Monitoring costs are assumed to be a linear function of the rm's
debt-to-capital ratio Lt, which the consumer takes as given.
Each share pays a dividend Dt and trades in the stock market at the price Pt. Every period,
the consumer receives income from her portfolio and decides how much to consume, Ct, and how
much to reinvest in the three assets. Denote all variables chosen or realized in period t with the
subscript t. Endogenous variables that are predetermined in period t carry the subscript t   1.
The consumer is innitely-lived and maximizes the expected present discounted value of her utility,
Et
P1
j=0 ju(Ct+j), with 0 <  < 1. The consumer's problem can be written recursively as follows:











1 + ~ rt

~ Bt + P
B;C
t Bt + PtSt = ~ Bt 1 + Bt 1 + (Pt + Dt)St 1   Tt (5)
 is an exogenous parameter that controls the scale of the debt friction. A high  implies that
monitoring costs are very sensitive to the rm's debt-to-capital ratio. The consumer must also pay
a lump-sum tax Tt, whose role will be explained later. The consumer's rst-order conditions are as
follows:
( ~ Bt) :
1




t = Et[Mt+1] (7)





Equations (1), (6), (7) relate the corporate interest rate rt to the rm's debt-to-capital ratio Lt
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,  > 0 (11)
4.2 Firm's problem
A representative rm operates a neoclassical production function F(Kt 1;ZtNt) and maximizes
the expected present discounted value of its stream of net equity payments to shareholders. Kt 1
is the rm's capital stock carried over from last period, Nt is labor input, Zt is labor-augmenting
technological progress, and Dt is the net equity payout. Labor input Nt is normalized to 1 for
all t; I abstract from uctuations in labor supply.7 Since the rm is owned by consumers, it
discounts payments to be made at time j > t using the consumer's stochastic discount factor,
Mt+j  u0(Ct+j)=u0(Ct). The rm attains its new capital stock Kt by issuing corporate bonds Bt
and by adjusting its net equity payout Dt. Interest paid on corporate bonds is tax-deductible, as
given by (2). Finally, the rm faces a quadratic adjustment cost when changing its equity payout,
as given by (3). The rm's problem can be written recursively as follows:
V (Kt 1;Bt 1;Dt 1) = max
Bt;Dt;Kt
fDt + Et [Mt+1V (Kt;Bt;Dt)]g (12)
+ t
n
F(Kt 1;Zt) + (1   )Kt 1 + P
B;F
t Bt   Bt 1   c(Dt;Dt 1;Kt 1)   Kt
o
(13)
t is the Lagrange multiplier on the rm's budget constraint,  is the depreciation rate of capital,




t ,  2 (0;1) (14)
The rm's budget constraint, with functional forms imposed, is as follows:
Kt = K
t 1Z1 
t + (1   )Kt 1 +
Bt
1 + (1   )rt







7It would be straightforward to extend the model to incorporate a labor-leisure decision along the lines of Hansen
(1997).
9In the Appendix I derive three Euler Equations for the rm { one each for bonds, dividends,
and capital. The Euler Equations are:
(Bt) :
t
1 + (1   )rt
= Et [Mt+1t+1] (16)
















































The debt-to-capital ratio is dened as the ratio of the rm's outstanding debt to its capital stock,
which is the rm's only asset. Note that consumers take the rm's debt-to-capital ratio as given
when solving their portfolio allocation problem. This is justied theoretically by the assumption
of innitesimally \small" consumers: each consumer perceives that her decision about how much
debt to hold does not aect the aggregate debt-to-capital ratio.
4.3 Equilibrium and solution technique





[1 + (1   )rt](1 + rt)

Bt (20)
The risk-free bond ~ Bt is in zero net supply. On the other hand, corporate borrowing Bt will
always be strictly positive because of the tax advantage. I normalize shares St to be 1 for all t.8 In
equilibrium, the consumer's budget constraint (5) then reduces to the following:
8Recall that conceptually, Dt represents dividends plus net repurchases of shares. However, because I normalize
St to 1 for all t, Dt equals dividends in the model, and there is technically no issuing or repurchasing activity. If
rms were allowed to change both Dt and the number of shares St, there would be an innite set of optimal values
for (Dt;St). To avoid this indeterminacy, I x the number of shares; but I could just as well have xed the dividend
level and let rms choose the number of shares. In the discussion that follows, I will continue to interpret Dt as
dividends plus net repurchases of shares.
10Ct = Dt + Bt 1  

1




I close the model by specifying a stochastic process for log productivity zt.
zt = z1t + z2t (22)
z1t = (1   1)g + 1z1t 1 + 1t , j1j < 1 (23)
z2t = 2z2t 1 + 2t , j2j < 1 (24)
E[1t] = E[2t] = 0 , V ar[1t] = 2
1 , V ar[2t] = 2
2 (25)
1t and 2t iid over time and independent of each other (26)
This specication oers the exibility of using a dierence-stationary shock, an AR(1) shock, or
a combination of both. An equilibrium is a sequence of prices and allocations such that all markets
clear when consumers and rms behave optimally, taking equilibrium prices as given.
I characterize the equilibrium in two steps. First, I nd the unique nonstochastic balanced
growth path (BGP) equilibrium where the variables Zt, Kt, Bt, Dt, Ct and Pt all grow at a constant
rate and the variables Lt, Mt, ~ rt, rt, and t are constant. Next, I log-linearize the equations of the
model around the nonstochastic BGP. This generates a system of linear expectational dierence
equations in a set of stationary variables. Finally, I solve this system computationally using a
technique described by Uhlig (1997). The result is an equilibrium law of motion and an equilibrium
policy rule.
5 Results
In this section I present results from simulating the model described in the previous section. First,
I explain how the model was calibrated. I then show and discuss impulse response functions for
debt and equity ows. Next, I discuss simulation results for the overall period 1952 { 2007. Finally,
I calibrate the model to the two subperiods 1952 { 1983 and 1984 { 2007 in order to account for
the change in volatilities of real and nancial variables over the past two decades.
5.1 Calibration
Table 3 summarizes the calibrated parameter values for the model. I set , the consumer's coecient
of relative risk aversion, to 2, a commonly used value in empirical macro studies. In the benchmark
specication, I use an AR(1) shock only, so there is no trend growth (g = 0). I set the persistence
of the shock, 2, to 0:95. The share of capital in income, , is set to 0:40, and the quarterly
11depreciation rate, , is set to 0.02. Following Jermann and Quadrini (2007), I set the marginal
corporate tax rate  to 0:30.
The rest of the parameters are calibrated to match particular moments in quarterly data for
the U.S. nonfarm business sector over the period 1952:1 { 2007:4. Given the assumption of no
trend growth, the subjective discount factor  pins down the real risk-free rate. I take the real
risk-free rate to be the average annualized yield on three-month Treasury bills over the quarter, net
of ination.9 This rate is 1:30%, which corresponds to a quarterly value of 0:99675 for . I scale
the technology shocks to match the standard deviation of GDP over the time period.
Given , the debt friction  determines the steady-state level of corporate borrowing. A higher
 makes the cost of borrowing more sensitive to the amount borrowed, which in turn leads to less
borrowing in the steady-state. I calibrate  to match the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the nonfarm
sector. The value of that ratio is 0:62, which corresponds to a value for  of 0:0384. The equity
friction parameter  captures the cost of adjusting the rm's equity payout. A higher  results in
\smoother" equity payouts over time. I calibrate  to match the standard deviation of net equity
payouts as a share of GDP. The volatility in the data is 1:14, corresponding to a value for  of
0.000655.10
5.2 Impulse Responses
To x intuition, it is helpful to look at impulse response functions for debt and equity ows. First,
consider a frictionless RBC model with no debt nancing and no equity adjustment cost. I represent
this in the model by removing Bt as a choice variable and setting  = 0. Consumption in this model
is just equal to the net equity payout.11 Figure 3 shows the impulse response function for net
equity payouts in the frictionless model. All impulse responses are expressed in terms of percentage
deviations from steady-state values. In response to a positive, persistent productivity shock, the
rm immediately raises its payout. The intuition is that after the shock, the rm's expected lifetime
protability is suddenly higher. Since the rm's objective is to maximize shareholder utility, and
since shareholders place positive weight on consumption today, the rm optimally raises its payout
immediately. As time goes on, the rm accumulates capital, increases output and raises its equity
payout still higher. Eventually, as the shock dies out, the rm's payout peaks and then declines
back to its steady-state value. It is important to realize that although the equity payout goes up on
impact, the rm is also investing more. Greater investment is optimal because high productivity
today forecasts high productivity tomorrow, which increases tomorrow's expected marginal product
of capital. Figure 4 shows the impulse response for investment. Since the rm is not raising equity
9I measure ination as the annualized percent change in the CPI over the quarter.
10I also tried the following variations, none of which signicantly altered the results. (i) I tried values for  in the
range of 0:5 to 2, including  = 1 (log utility). (ii) I used a dierence stationary shock, rst with g = 0 and then with
g = ln(1:5). (iii) I set  = 0:3. (iv) I set  = 0:2, recalibrating  as described above. Results available on request.
11See equation (21). Recall that when there are no frictions, debt is indeterminate; this is the classic prediction of
Modigliani and Miller (1958). Therefore, in the frictionless model, I do not allow rms to borrow, and I set Bt = 0
for all t.
12capital (it is instead increasing payments to shareholders), the rm nances its investment through
its stock of internal funds. The rm prefers to nance using internal funds because issuing equity
would detract too much from shareholder utility. Note that today's positive productivity shock
increases the stock of internal funds available for both investment and equity payouts.
Now consider the full model with both debt and equity nancing. Figure 5 shows impulses
response for the equity payout. I consider two cases: the dashed line sets  = 0, and the the solid
line sets  = 0:000655 (its calibrated value). Consider rst the case of no equity adjustment cost
(labeled \No Friction" in the gures). In response to a positive and persistent productivity shock,
the equity payout now increases steeply on impact, then returns quickly to its steady-state value.
The intuition is that with access to tax-advantaged debt, the rm can \borrow from bondholders
to pay shareholders." Despite the apparent spike in the equity payout, consumers still face a
relatively smooth consumption prole, as shown in Figure 7. The reason is that consumers are
also the bondholders in general equilibrium, and the net issuance of corporate bonds to consumers
largely osets the increase in equity payouts. Indeed, Figure 6 shows that with no equity adjustment
cost, the rm's net issuance of debt on impact nearly equals the change in its equity payout. Unlike
equity, however, debt declines gradually back towards its steady-state level. The ongoing issuance
of debt nances capital investment; this is illustrated in Figure 8.
The introduction of the equity adjustment cost signicantly dampens the rm's equity payout.
In particular, Figure 5 shows that the increase of equity payouts on impact is less than one-fth
of the increase in the no-adjustment-cost scenario. Since adjustment costs are a pure deadweight
loss, the rm faces a strong incentive to smooth its equity payout. As a result, the rm engages in
much less \borrowing from bondholders to pay shareholders." Figure 6 shows that relative to the
no-adjustment-cost case, the rm borrows less on impact and reaches peak borrowing only after a
delay.
While the impact of the frictions on nancial variables is signicant, the impact on real alloca-
tions is very small. Figures 7 and 8 show that the impulse responses of consumption and investment
do not change much when I add the calibrated equity adjustment cost. In addition, these impulse
responses are very similar to their counterparts in the frictionless model with no debt. Contrast this
result with Jermann and Quadrini (2007), where the severity of nancial frictions has a signicant
eect on the impulse responses of real variables. The Jermann and Quadrini result depends on
two key features not present in my model: (i) a debt ceiling above which the rm cannot borrow
at any price, and (ii) an asset-price shock that alters the debt ceiling without aecting aggregate
productivity. This suggests that the theoretical eect of nancial frictions on the real economy
depends critically on how both the frictions and the shocks are modeled.
5.3 Volatilities and Cross Correlations
Table 4 presents selected business cycle statistics from simulating the model and compares them
with the corresponding moments in the data. I simulate the calibrated model by generating 50
13sample paths of 200 quarters each for productivity, discarding the rst 100 quarters. I compute
business cycle statistics for each sample path and take averages over the 50 samples. I apply an
HP lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 to both actual and simulated data.12 I consider the
model with and without an equity adjustment cost. Looking at the standard deviations, the full
model is able to replicate the volatility of the equity-payout-to-GDP ratio observed in the data.
Recall that I calibrated  to 0:000655 in order to match this moment. Although this may appear
to be a small friction, it makes a big dierence. When I set  = 0, the implied volatility of equity
payouts jumps from 1:14 to 6:51 { almost six times higher than in the data. As suggested by the
impulse response functions, the adjustment cost results in \smoother" equity payouts over time.
Looking at correlations, equity payouts and debt issued are (i) positively correlated with output,
(ii) positively correlated with investment, and (iii) positively correlated with each other, consistent
with the stylized facts described in Section 2. These results hold both with and without equity
adjustment costs. The tax advantage on debt, combined with monitoring costs, is sucient to
replicate these correlations. I interpret this as evidence that the interest tax deduction and concerns
about excessive leverage inuence the aggregate behavior of debt and equity ows over the business
cycle.
These results also provide some evidence for a \dynamic tradeo theory" of capital structure.
Given the costs and benets of debt, rms appear to target an optimal debt-equity ratio. However,
the target itself changes over time as shocks impact rms' resources and alter their forecasts for
future productivity. Of course, the evidence presented is all at the aggregate level. More convincing
evidence of a dynamic tradeo theory would require an empirical rm-level analysis, which is beyond
the scope of this paper.
The model is somewhat less successful at matching the absolute values of some key volatilities.
Note that the volatility of (log) real GDP was calibrated to match the data. The model's volatility
of investment is close to the data, as in standard RBC models. However, the model's volatility of
debt is too high; and the model's volatilities for the ratio of outstanding debt to equity (\debt-
equity ratio") and the ratio of equity payments to equity outstanding (\payout-to-market-value")
are too low. The latter two ratios depend in large part on the movement of stock prices in the data,
which are much more volatile than predicted by most macro models. However, as I show below,
the model is more successful at replicating changes in these volatilities over time.
5.4 Changes in Volatilities over Time
As documented in Section 2, the business cycle volatilities of output and investment have declined
substantially starting in the mid-1980s, a well known phenomenon known as business cycle moder-
ation. Jermann and Quadrini (2007) document that during the same period, the nancial structure
12Results are similar when the simulated data is left unltered. Furthermore, the business cycle statistics in the
data don't change much under alternative lters, such as the Baxter-King band-pass lter. Results available on
request.
14of rms has become more volatile { a nding that I also replicated in Section 2. In particular, the
volatility of equity payouts has increased by over 50% from the period 1952 { 1983 to the period
1984 { 2005. In this section I demonstrate that the model can successfully account for the joint
ndings of dampened real volatility and increased nancial volatility.
Since nancial frictions do not have large real eects in my framework, I adopt the position
of Arias et al. (2006) and assume that the decline in real volatility is a result of less volatile
productivity shocks. For example, the second subperiod was not characterized by the oil supply
disruptions and large swings in ination that marked the 1970s. On the other hand, I assume that
the increase in nancial volatility was driven by innovations in nancial markets that eased the
frictions in the model. Such innovations include the wide adoption of securitized assets and SEC
rules facilitating greater exibility in equity oerings and repurchases; see Jermann and Quadrini
(2007) for other examples.
I proceed by calibrating the volatility of technology shocks 2, the debt friction  and the
equity friction  separately for each subperiod. As before, my calibration targets are the standard
deviation of GDP, the average debt-GDP ratio and the standard deviation of the equity-payout-
to-GDP ratio. Table 5 presents my results. The model is fairly successful at matching relative
volatilities across the two time periods. Given that GDP volatility declined by about 50%, the
model predicts a 50% decline in the volatilities of real investment and consumption, consistent
with the data. By calibrating , I am able to match a 50% increase in the average value of the
debt-to-GDP ratio. By calibrating , I also reproduce the roughly 70% increase in the volatility
of equity payouts. The model also matches, at least qualitatively, relative volatilities for four
variables that were not calibration targets: the debt-issued-to-GDP ratio, the debt-equity ratio,
the payout-to-market-value ratio, and the real risk-free rate. The results in Table 5 are calculated
from HP-ltered data. Results from unltered data were similar and are available on request.
The model provides an alternative explanation for the joint ndings of dampened real volatility
and increased nancial volatility over the past two decades. In my framework, the moderation in
real business cycles is driven by the \good fortune" of less volatile productivity shocks, while the
increase in nancial volatility is a result of reduced nancial frictions. Note that the reduction
in nancial frictions is sucient to increase nancial volatility even in the presence of dampened
technology shocks, which by themselves would decrease nancial volatility. In contrast, Jermann
and Quadrini (2007) present a model where nancial innovations drive both results. Their model
relies on an asset price shock and an endogenous debt ceiling that transmits pure nancial shocks
to the real sector. In order to discriminate between the two explanations, one would need to pin
down the relative importance of asset price shocks and technology shocks in the data. Identifying
and quantifying dierent types of shocks involves many challenges, not the least of which is to
arrive at meaningful and agreed-upon denitions. I defer this topic for future research.
156 Conclusion
I have shown that an RBC model with an explicit capital structure decision can explain a number
of stylized facts about aggregate debt and equity ows in U.S. data. I developed an augmented
RBC model characterized by three nancial frictions: a debt tax shield, debt monitoring costs, and
(optionally) an equity adjustment cost. The tax shield and costly monitoring pin down an optimal,
positive amount of debt issued. The equity adjustment cost allows for more realistic uctuations
of equity payouts in response to technology shocks. In calibrated simulations, the model correctly
implies that debt issued and equity payouts are both positively correlated with GDP, positively
correlated with investment, and positively correlated with each other. Finally, I use the model to
explain the nding of Jermann and Quadrini (2007) that real variables have become less volatile
over the last two decades, while nancial ows have become more volatile. By varying both the
scale of the technology shocks and the degree of nancial frictions, I can account for both results.
A number of avenues are available for further research. One straightforward extension would
be to estimate the key parameters of the model ( and ) using a simulated method-of-moments
technique. This would potentially generate a better t with the data. The model has implications
for the capital structure decisions of individual rms. For example, rms with high tax exposure
and rms that are easily monitored should make greater use of debt nancing than other rms.
Furthermore, as a rm's tax exposure and other characteristics change over time, its reliance on
debt nancing should also change. These implications could be tested in rm-level panel data. A
more ambitious extension would involve extending the model to an international setting. A two-
country version of the model with trade in nancial assets and asymmetric nancial frictions would
have predictions for debt and equity ows across countries. I plan to pursue these ideas in future
work.
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17Appendix
A Derivation of Euler Equations for Firm's Problem
The rm's problem can be written as follows:
V (Kt 1;Bt 1;Dt 1) = max
Bt;Dt;Kt
fDt + EtMt+1V (Kt;Bt;Dt)g (27)
+t

F(Kt 1;Zt) + (1   )Kt 1 +
Bt
1 + (1   )rt




(Bt) : EtMt+1VB(Kt;Bt;Dt) +
t
1 + (1   )rt
= 0 (29)
(Dt) : 1 + EtMt+1VD(Kt;Bt;Dt)   tc1(Dt;Dt 1;Kt 1) = 0 (30)
(Kt) : EtMt+1VK(Kt;Bt;Dt)   t = 0 (31)
From the envelope conditions, we have:
VK(Kt;Bt;Dt) = t+1 [FK(Kt;Zt+1) + (1   )   c3(Dt+1;Dt;Kt)] (32)
VB(Kt;Bt;Dt) =  t+1 (33)
VD(Kt;Bt;Dt) =  t+1c2(Dt+1;Dt;Kt) (34)
Substituting the envelope conditions back into the rst-order conditions:
(Bt) :
t
1 + (1   )rt
  EtMt+1t+1 = 0 (35)
(Dt) : 1   EtMt+1t+1c2(Dt+1;Dt;Kt)   tc1(Dt;Dt 1;Kt 1) = 0 (36)
(Kt) : EtMt+1t+1 [FK(Kt;Zt+1) + (1   )   c3(Dt+1;Dt;Kt)]   t = 0 (37)




t ,  2 (0;1) (38)






,  > 0 (39)
Applying the functional forms above to equations (35), (36) and (37) gives the Euler Equations
listed in the main text.
18B Full List of Equations Characterizing Equilibrium
For convenience, all the equations of the model are reproduced here:
1
1 + ~ rt
= Et[Mt+1] (40)













t + (1   )Kt 1 +
Bt
1 + (1   )rt






















































Ct = Dt + Bt 1  

1




zt = z1t + z2t (50)
z1t = (1   1)g + 1z1t 1 + 1t , j1j < 1 (51)
z2t = 2z2t 1 + 2t , j2j < 1 (52)
E[1t] = E[2t] = 0 , V ar[1t] = 2
1 , V ar[2t] = 2
2 (53)
19Variables Correlation
(Equity Payout, GDP) 0.16
(Debt Issued, GDP) 0.45
(Real Fixed Investment, GDP) 0.90
(Equity Payout, Real Fixed Investment) 0.19
(Debt Issued, Real Fixed Investment) 0.52
(Equity Payout, Debt Issued) 0.38
Table 1: Business cycle correlations for selected real and nancial variables from 1952 { 2007. \Debt
Issued" is the net increase in credit market liabilities. A negative number reects a net repayment
of debt by businesses. \Equity Payout" equals dividends plus net repurchases of equity shares in
the corporate sector, less proprietors' net investment in the noncorporate sector. GDP is real gross
value-added in the nonfarm business sector. All variables are detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott
lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Sources: Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve Board and
NIPA Accounts, BEA.
20Standard Deviations ( 100) 1952{1983 1984{2007 Late/Early
Equity Payout / GDP 0.85 1.44 1.69
Debt Issued / GDP 1.32 1.69 1.28
Log Real GDP 2.56 1.18 0.46
Log Real Fixed Investment 5.58 3.63 0.65
Table 2: Changes in selected business cycle statistics for the Nonfarm sector between 1952 { 1983
and 1984 { 2007. All variables are detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott lter with a smoothing
parameter of 1600. Sources: Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve Board and NIPA Accounts, BEA.
21Parameter Value Calibration Target Target Value
 2 Standard in literature
 0.99675 Real risk-free rate 1.30%
G 1 Zero growth in steady-state
 0.40 Standard in literature
 0.02 Standard in literature
 0.30 Jermann and Quadrini
2 0.95 Standard in literature
2 0.0282 Std dev of GDP (x100) 2.09
 0.0384 Mean of Debt / GDP 0.62
 0.000655 Std dev of Equity Payout / GDP (x100) 1.14
Table 3: Calibration.
22Standard Deviations ( 100) Data Full Model  = 0
Equity Payout / GDP 1.14 1.14 6.49
Debt Issued / GDP 1.49 4.53 7.55
Debt Outstanding / Equity Outstanding 3.17 0.02 0.04
Equity Payout / Equity Outstanding 0.84 0.01 0.03
Log Real GDP 2.09 2.09 2.09
Log Fixed Investment 4.84 5.11 5.05
Correlations Data Full Model  = 0
(Equity Payout, GDP) 0.16 0.81 0.39
(Debt Issued, GDP) 0.45 0.60 0.96
(Real Fixed Investment, GDP) 0.90 1.00 1.00
(Equity Payout, Real Fixed Investment) 0.19 0.83 0.40
(Debt Issued, Real Fixed Investment) 0.52 0.57 0.97
(Equity Payout, Debt Issued) 0.38 0.26 0.43
Table 4: Standard deviations and correlations from data and model, HP-ltered.
231952 { 1983 1984 { 2007 Late/Early
Mean Data Model Data Model Data Model
Debt Stock / GDP 0.51 0.51 0.78 0.78 1.53 1.53
Standard Deviations ( 100) Data Model Data Model Data Model
Equity Payout / GDP 0.85 0.86 1.44 1.44 1.69 1.67
Debt Issued / GDP 1.32 3.70 1.69 3.76 1.28 1.02
Debt Outst. / Equity Outst. 2.83 0.02 3.57 0.02 1.26 1.11
Equity Payout / Equity Outst. 0.72 0.00 0.98 0.01 1.36 1.76
Log Real GDP 2.56 2.56 1.18 1.18 0.46 0.46
Log Investment 5.58 6.30 3.63 2.86 0.65 0.45
Log Consumption 1.47 0.63 0.73 0.29 0.49 0.46
Real T-Bill Rate 133.04 0.08 124.73 0.03 0.94 0.40
Table 5: Changes in business cycle statistics for the Nonfarm sector between 1952 { 1983 and 1984
{ 2007.
24Figure 1: Aggregate debt and equity ows and aggregate real investment in the U.S. nonfarm
sector, in billions of chained 2000 dollars. Sources: Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve Board and
NIPA Accounts, BEA.
25Figure 2: Median debt-to-capital ratios for rms by long-term S&P credit rating. Here \capital"
refers to a rm's outstanding debt plus its outstanding equity, which together equal the rm's
assets. Each bar in the graph plots the median debt-to-capital ratio among all active Compustat
rms with the given credit rating. Source: Compustat, author's calculations.
26Figure 3: Impulse response for net equity payout in a frictionless model.
Figure 4: Impulse response for investment in a frictionless model.
27Figure 5: Impulse responses for net equity payout.
Figure 6: Impulse responses for debt.
28Figure 7: Impulse responses for consumption.
Figure 8: Impulse responses for investment.
29